The Market Does Not Care If You Are Right

  • Being right about the future doesn"t guarantee investment success
  • Markets price expectations, not simply business performance or news
  • Great investing requires understanding price, expectations and a margin of safety.

You can be completely right about the future and still make a terrible investment.

That distinction took me ~30 years and a large financial scar to fully appreciate.

In the late 1990s, I invested in Cisco.

The thesis was logical:

The internet was expanding at extraordinary speed, Cisco supplied the networking equipment powering it, revenue was compounding at 57% a year, gross margins were above 60% and profits were soaring.

The internet didn"t disappoint. Cisco didn"t fail as a business. I simply paid too much for the future I believed was coming.

My thesis about the technology was right, but I lost nearly 90% on this specific trade.

Think about that for a moment…

How could one of the largest capitalized stocks on the S&P 500 lose ~90% of its value over the next three years?

It"s unthinkable… but it happened.

Why?

Internet stocks – like Cisco – were priced for absolute perfection.

And this is the lesson we will explore.

Investors are paying up for names in the AI trade today.

However, being right about the (AI) future and being right about an investment are two entirely different things.

Reality Is Not the Same as Expectations

Markets don"t simply price what is happening — they price what investors expect to happen.

Over the past few weeks we"ve seen some violent moves in certain stocks.

But here"s the thing:

A company can report very strong earnings and watch its stock fall. Another can report disappointing results and rally hard.

Why?

Because it depends on what investors expected to happen.

And it"s not just company earnings…

For example, how many times this year have we seen a geopolitical crisis escalate and equities rally. Or there is news of a ceasefire and stocks fall.

The market isn"t asking whether news is objectively good or bad.

It is asking: is this better or worse than what was already reflected in the price?

History is littered with examples of investors who correctly identified a world-changing structural trend, yet suffered poor returns because expectations got completely out of hand.

When the British railway mania took hold in the 1840s, investors were entirely correct that steam locomotives would revolutionize commerce, trade, and human travel.

However, the sheer volume of competing capital that flooded into the sector drove returns on capital through the floor.

Technology and society won. But the economics for many investors did not.

And this is where investing gets much harder: you need to make a disciplined judgement about expectations.

Today – expectations are very high.

The Price of Being Right

This is where valuation becomes far more nuanced than simply asking whether a stock is "cheap" or "expensive."

Consider two investors looking at the exact same enterprise.

Both agree—and correctly forecast—that the company will grow its earnings by 15% annually over the next decade.

  • Investor A buys at a valuation that assumes 25% annual growth.
  • Investor B buys at a valuation that assumes just 8%.
  • Both correctly forecast 15% growth.

Investor A loses money as the multiple contracts to meet reality, while Investor B makes an exceptional return as earnings outperform the conservative expectations.

Two completely different investment outcomes despite both forecasting 15% growth.

Investor B did not need to predict the future with precision.

What they did was take the time to understand what the current price was asking you to believe (e.g., just 8% growth).

Now if you are looking at "hot" stocks today – ask yourself these four basic questions:

  • What growth rate is implied by the current multiple?
  • What profit margins are required to sustain it?
  • How long can the competitive moat actually endure? And most importantly
  • What happens to my investment if my assumptions are slightly wrong?

This is also where the concept of a "margin of safety" becomes important.

You don"t need every assumption to be exactly right. You need enough room between what you pay and what the business ultimately delivers to allow for some of your assumptions to be wrong.

It"s one of the principles that has underpinned Buffett"s success for decades.

That is the gap between what must happen for the investment to work and what could reasonably happen if reality falls short.

For example, if you"re paying something like 30x forward earnings for a company whose valuation assumes 20% earnings growth for years to come – then you"re leaving little room for error.

You Don"t Need to Predict the Future

I"ve never been a great forecaster.

If someone asks me tomorrow what the Index will be next week, month or year – I would say I have no clue.

You are better off flipping a coin.

And that goes equally for trying to forecast interest rates, bond yields, inflation and employment.

As a result, I pay zero attention in trying to forecast these things. It"s a fool"s errand.

But you do not need to predict the future better than everyone else.

If you can evaluate what the current price assumes about the future, you have created an advantage over investors who are simply betting on the narrative.

Take today"s AI buildout….

This is a space I know well given my background.

Over the past few years I"ve written extensively about how AI will likely change the world.

But as an investor, I don"t need to guess which frontier model dominates in ten years, how fast token inference costs decline, or which hyperscaler ultimately captures the most value.

Those are fascinating questions and certainly occupy a lot of airtime in the media.

But the real investment work looks like this:

  • What level of growth and capital expenditure is required to justify today"s valuations?
  • How much competitive pressure could change those unit economics?
  • What happens to my returns if the future turns out to be merely very good rather than extraordinary?

But if you listen to mainstream media or watch some of the "investors" on YouTube – you could be forgiven for thinking that investing is a competition to construct the most exciting vision of the future.

Next time you listen to someone offer commentary on why you must own "SpaceX" or "Palantir" – listen to see if they answer each of the questions above. It"s more likely you will simply hear an exciting narrative around why "this is the future".

For me, successful investing is a discipline of allocating capital when the relationship between price, expectations, and probable outcomes is attractive.

Putting It All Together

There are many exceptional companies available today (not just in tech)

Companies around the world are working on super exciting narratives – with many seeing their earnings soar.

But as I experienced almost thirty years ago – that investment can still be terrible if you pay a price that demands perfection.

On the other hand…

A company can look unglamorous, its growth can be modest, and its story can attract almost no attention—yet the investment can produce exceptional returns if the price does not properly reflect the underlying economics.

That has been one of Buffett"s greatest strengths: recognizing that a wonderful business only becomes a wonderful investment when the price makes sense.

In closing – none of us know what the future will hold. For example, we do not know:

  • what companies will dominate over the next decade;
  • how technologies will evolve and change our lives; and most importantly
  • how the economic benefits may accrue across the stack.

All of that is okay.

We don"t need to know exactly what the future holds. What we need to do is make sure we have not paid a price that requires us to be right about every detail.

The market doesn"t care if we are right. It cares whether reality turns out to be better or worse than the expectations embedded in the price you paid.

That is the difference between having a good prediction and making a good investment.

Regards,
Adrian Tout